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Approved For Release 2003/04/22 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001600070001-9


21 June 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Science & Technology

SUBJECT: Reallocation of the Functions of the Collection
Guidance Staff

Pursuant to our discussions on the subject, I request you take the necessary steps to accomplish the following actions effective 1 July 1967:

1. Disband the Collection Guidance Staff.
2. Establish an Information Requirements Staff (IRS) in the Directorate of Intelligence with the responsibility for servicing the needs of the intelligence-producing offices of the Directorates of Intelligence and of Science and Technology in the field of information requirements. (A statement of the mission and functions of the IRS is contained in Attachment A.)
3. Establish an Information Requirements Advisory Group (IRAG) to facilitate common action among the intelligence-producing components of the Agency and the IRS on information requirements and to assist, as appropriate, Agency operating officials, in developing consistent CIA positions on information gaps, priorities, and requirements policies. (The terms of reference for the IRAG are presented in Attachment B.)



Rufus Taylor
Vice Admiral, U. S. Navy
Deputy Director

Attachments:

- A. Mission & Functions of IRS
- B. Terms of Reference for IRAG

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cc: Executive Director

D/DCI/NIPE

Special Assistant to the Director

Deputy Director for Plans

Deputy Director for Support

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Attachment A

Mission and Functions of the
Information Requirements Staff (IRS)

MISSION

The Information Requirements Staff is the central mechanism for processing, recording, and coordinating the information requirements of the intelligence-producing offices of the Directorates of Intelligence and Science and Technology and for assisting the DDI and the DDS&T in matters related to the collection of information.


FUNCTIONS

The Information Requirements Staff will:

1. Provide the central mechanism for information requirements by:
 - a. Assigning numbers to requirements and recording their contents and disposition for registry and retrieval purposes;
 - b. Notifying analysts of opportunities for acquiring needed information;
 - c. Informing analysts with proposed new requirements about related existing requirements levied by others in CIA and in other agencies;

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- d. Arranging for coordination of requirements among intelligence-producing components with related responsibilities;
 - e. Arranging and fostering, when requested, direct analyst-collector contacts;
 - f. Directing requirements to specific collectors on an all-source basis in accordance with known capabilities;
 - g. Assisting analysts to terminate collection requirements which have been filled or are obsolete and to modify existing requirements as necessary;
 - h. Conducting liaison with information collection requirement units in other agencies; and
 - i. On request, arranging for analysts to prepare substantive evaluations of reported information.
2. Assist the DDI, the DDS&T and, as appropriate, the DDP by providing staff support for:
- a. Formulating CIA positions on collection requirement matters under consideration by USIB committees when no other appropriate mechanism exists;
 - b. Coordinating collection coverage requirements for multi-purpose collection systems;
 - c. Producing general collection guides; and

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d. Surveying and assessing the over-all effectiveness of the requirements process by maintaining registries, inventories, and other records.

3. Conduct the CIA program for briefing and debriefing of military attaches, embassy personnel, and other U. S. officials who serve abroad.

4. Conduct working-level liaison with other USIB agencies.

The Chief of the Information Requirements Staff will:

1. Participate in the meetings of the Information Requirements Advisory Group (IRAG) and provide staff support to the IRAG as directed.

2. Assist the IRAG and the intelligence-producing offices in developing common standards and procedures to be applied by supervisors for validating analysts' requirements and for monitoring analysts' performance in levying requirements.

3. Advise the heads of intelligence-producing components about problems related to information requirements and recommend remedial action as appropriate.

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Attachment B

Terms of Reference for
The Information Requirements Advisory Group (IRAG)

1. The Information Requirements Advisory Group is established in order to facilitate common action among the intelligence production components of the Agency on information requirements policies and problems. Its members are: The Assistant Deputy Director for Intelligence (Chairman), a representative of the Deputy Director for Plans, the Chief, Information Requirements Staff, and the Deputy Director (or his representative) of FMSAC, OBI, OCI, ONE, ORR, and OSI. Representatives of collection and processing activities may be asked by the Chairman to participate in meetings of the Group as appropriate.

2. The general and continuing responsibilities of the IRAG are:

a. To review problems arising out of the information requirements process, both as they relate to the collector-producer relationship and as they involve the responsibilities of office directors and division chiefs;

b. To recommend specific actions or develop programs and procedures to resolve the problems; and

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c. To assist in developing guidance to collectors, including evaluating reported information, with the objective of achieving the efficient use of collection resources relative to the needs of producers for intelligence information.

3. The initial and specific responsibilities of the IRAG are to undertake the planning and to propose the actions necessary to implement various recommendations contained in the IG Survey. These are:

a. To devise practical measures to assist the directors of the member offices and their substantive division chiefs in carrying out their responsibilities for control, validation, and recording of requirements; for communication on needs with collectors; and for periodic audit of office and division performance in the field of information requirements (Recommendations Nos. 24 and 25);

b. To undertake the preparation of collection guides as needed on selected intelligence problems (Recommendation No. 13);

c. To reassess the Current Intelligence Reporting List (CIRL) and recommend remedial action (Recommendations Nos. 10, 11, and 12); and

d. To develop measures facilitating communication and exchange of information between CIA analysts and CIA collectors (Recommendation No. 7).

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If the IRAG concludes that a recommendation of the Survey is not feasible, practical, or desirable, it will so advise the Deputy Director for Intelligence and the Deputy Director for Science and Technology.

4. The recommendations of the IRAG, upon approval of the Directorates concerned, will constitute guidance to the Chief, Information Requirements Staff.

5. Meetings of the IRAG will be held at the initiative of the chairman or upon the request of any member. Special meetings may be called between the chairman and selected members on topics of concern only to one of a few offices and which are not of general interest to the IRAG as a whole. The Information Requirements Staff will provide necessary secretariat assistance.

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2 June 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Proposed Reallocation of Functions of the
Collection Guidance Staff (CGS)

1. Insofar as the proposed new Information Requirements Staff and Information Requirements Advisory Group serve Agency purposes, any comment on my part is purely gratuitous. The functions proposed for the new IRS strike me as substantially similar to the present charter of the CGS and I believe serve a useful purpose which should be continued. From the context in which this memorandum has been presented, however, and particularly from Ed Proctor's memorandum proposing the creation of this staff, it appears very clearly that it will no longer be available to support the Director's community staff (NIPE). If, therefore, this proposal is adopted in its present form, I believe that the effectiveness of NIPE will be very seriously impaired. My present inclination under those circumstances would be to recommend that NIPE be abolished and that some new instrumentality be established to support the DCI's coordinating responsibility.

2. It is, I believe, self-evident that any attempt to evaluate intelligence programs must begin with an authoritative determination of the informational needs which these programs serve. The community's needs for information can best be determined (and probably only be determined) through substantially the same components and individuals as those responsible for levying requirements and a process which is substantially similar to the process through which requirements are reviewed and validated. (See Tab A for an elaboration of this premise.)

3. In order to carry out the responsibilities contemplated by Mr. McCone for my position, I have consistently maintained that I myself and a few of my subordinates require immediate and easy access to some

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staff element of the Agency which was capable of obtaining or formulating an authoritative position concerning the value of the information obtainable from particular activities or systems. The former DDI agreed that the CGS could perform this function and support me and the very limited number of people on my staff engaged in program evaluation. It was also agreed that the CGS would support the Chairman of the CCPC of USIB (see Tab B), the activities of which I thought would contribute to the rationalization of intelligence programs (which, in the last analysis, was my assignment).

4. It is now proposed to terminate this arrangement and require requests for evaluation of substantive needs to be made by me, or my subordinates, directly to the DDI or his immediate subordinate. This would be an arrangement substantially comparable to the one by which the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis, for example, submits requests for substantive intelligence support. It is totally unacceptable.

5. I recognize that staff-to-staff relationships are a burden and create confusion. They are very likely to make the ultimate managers responsible for the element providing the staff support miserable, suspicious and unhappy. However, the arrangement which has existed with the CGS and which I propose to continue is by no means without precedent. For example, in the EE Division of the Clandestine Service a staff element of the German Branch provided support and guidance to and staffed out problems involving the operations of a different and parallel component (the SR Division). Members of the EE staff providing this support were of course responsible and held accountable for keeping their superiors in the Division informed of developments and securing approval on matters of policy as required. Another somewhat comparable situation was the arrangement under which Tom Parrott was authorized direct access to all elements of the Agency for the purpose of formulating a DCI position in the OCB and, later, in connection with the support rendered by the Agency to General Maxwell Taylor and McGeorge Bundy.


6. Whether these precedents are valid or not, however, is not particularly relevant. The objectives of the NIPE Staff, as I understand them, can only be achieved if authorized representatives of my staff have immediate, informal and easy access to some Agency element, substantially similar to the present Collection Guidance Staff, which will produce

CIA/DCI positions on various matters on a continuing basis. It would be the responsibility, of course, of this Agency element to check out its positions internally within its own line of command and, where appropriate, with the Deputy Director or other senior official of the Agency immediately concerned.

7. It is no particular concern of mine as to where such an Agency staff element is located. However, if the new IRS is established as proposed, it would hardly seem logical or sensible to create another additional staff within the Agency with overlapping functions and responsibility.

8. Unless support arrangements substantially similar to the one I am suggesting can be worked out, my recommendation will be to transfer the functions for which I am now responsible to the office of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, along with most of the personnel now engaged in program evaluation in support of the Director's community responsibility. As I have told you before, I believe that a move along these lines at some point should be made anyway. As far as I am concerned, therefore, I would simply be recommending that it be made somewhat sooner than I had anticipated.

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JOHN A. BROSS
D/DCI/NIPE

Attachments

cc: ExDirector-Comptroller

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2 June 1967

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Evaluation Support Required by the DCI in His Community Capacity

1. The DCI (or his representative) must develop a position concerning the value of the contribution made by systems or activities to the informational needs of the Government. (This usually involves a determination of whether a given system, or a particular product of a given system, contributes substantially or only marginally to the real needs of the Government for information.) Specific examples of this kind of problem are:

a. The needs of the Government for information obtainable from Chinese communications relating to various kinds of Chinese military activities.

b. The need of the Government for information contained in encrypted communications which are more than 10 or 15 years old.

c. The needs of the Government for ELINT and telemetry now collected from places like [redacted] and whether comparable information could be obtained from ELINT or telemetry collected from satellite systems.

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d. The informational value of communications transmitted by satellite communications systems.

[redacted]

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f. The value of knowing the exact location of a silo in the Soviet Union. (This will determine focal length of the stellar index camera to be employed on a given satellite reconnaissance system.)

g. Can we eliminate any countries from our crypt-analytical target list?

h. How soon do we have to receive reports of the movements of Soviet aircraft or of Soviet weather or of Soviet shipping activity?

i. How essential is a real time readout capability to the early warning requirement?


2. The foregoing is a short list of typical questions which have to be answered authoritatively in one context or another. These questions come up in a number of ways. They may determine the answers to questions presented to the Executive Committee of the NRO. They may be involved in review of various programs such as the CCP and the CIP. They continually come up in USIB committee meetings and have to be answered by USIB committee chairmen or by the CIA members of USIB committees. They may take the form of presentations to the PFIAB, BoB, etc. The DCI's ability to provide reasonably accurate and authoritative answers to these questions will determine his ability to provide "effective guidance and coordination" to the intelligence effort of the Government.

3. The DCI cannot afford to have two authoritative centers of guidance as to whether we do or do not need, and how badly, and why we need, coverage of Mauritania or coverage of the movements of the Soviet Long Range Air Force. Positions on such matters, which will largely determine whether the DCI should approve or disapprove programs and expenditures, must be very carefully formulated on the basis of inputs from the appropriate components of CIA. This is likely to mean the DDI but may involve more than one component of DDI. It is also likely to involve ONE and components of DDS&T.

4. The final DCI position, or the option available to him, on any given question will of course be based not only on judgments about the substantive value of the information involved but also on other factors. The cost of acquiring the information is a principal factor. Judgments will also have to be made with due regard to intangible factors such as political attitudes, etc. These, however, can be assembled and presented by the DCI's community staff.

JOHN A. BROSS
D/DCI/NIPE

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17 April 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: CIA Representation on the Critical
Collection Problems Committee (CCPC)


1. This memorandum contains a recommendation for DCI approval. Such recommendation is contained in paragraph 9.

2. I believe that there is general agreement concerning the importance of the CCPC as a potential instrument for achieving concerted action by the Intelligence Community against Priority National Intelligence Objectives.

3. DCID 2/2, which establishes the Committee, provides that "representation on the Committee may include members from the departments or agencies represented on the United States Intelligence Board." Whatever the provisions of the charter, an effective CCPC will require representation thereon from the intelligence organizations conducting major collection operations. Hence the present non-CIA representation should be maintained notwithstanding the recent change in the membership of the Intelligence Board itself. (Note: present membership includes State, DIA, Army, Navy, Air Force, AEC, FBI and CIA.)

4. DDP has traditionally represented CIA on the Committee. At the time the Committee was first established, DDP represented substantially all of the collection facilities of CIA. With the transfer of the reconnaissance responsibility to DD/S&T and the very substantial expansion of this responsibility, it would seem to me desirable to have DD/S&T represented on the Committee in addition to the DDP. Representation by two components of CIA appears compatible with the language of DCID 2/2 quoted above

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governing representation on the Committee and consistent with the objective of having all components of the Government with substantial responsibilities in the collection field represented.



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a. Whether in fact additional collection efforts are justified, and

b. If they are, what elements of the problem or situation require priority attention, i.e., what the deficiencies are.

8. I believe that the DDI Collection Guidance Staff (CGS) is best qualified to give this type of support. Using the CGS in

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this way would also provide an informal means of covering the interests of DDI's collection components. Dr. Cline concurs.

9. I therefore recommend that [] in his capacity as Chairman of the CCPC, be given direct access to the Collection Guidance Staff and be authorized to look to this staff for support.

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[]

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JOHN A BROSS
D/DCI/NIPE

Recommendation Approved:

[]

Acting Director of Central Intelligence

25 April 64
Date

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